INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the extent to which decentralization is optimal and how to delegate in a firm. A principal employs two agents to work on a project whose success or failure is observable and verifiable. The probability of success depends on the agents' effort levels. The agents work in sequence. Agent 1's effort is known to both agents while agent 2's effort is his private information. The principal does not observe either effort level. Agent 1 might be a designer such as an architect (or a research and article no. ET962462 development department in a firm). He delivers a blueprint to agent 2, who is a builder (or a production department in the firm). Agent 2 discovers agent 1's effort by examining the blueprint, but agent 1 does not monitor the actual production process and thus cannot observe agent 2's effort. The principal's objective is to minimize the cost of getting both agents to work hard. There is limited liability: no wage can be less than zero. Therefore, the agents must receive some form of rent. Our paper studies how the optimal way of decentralizing minimizes that rent. 1 The Revelation Principle suggests the following centralized, two-tier mechanism. After observing agent 1's effort, agent 2 sends a message to the principal: if he says``agent 1 shirked'' then agent 1 is paid nothing; if he says``agent 1 worked'' then agent 1 is paid just enough when the project succeeds to give him the incentive to participate agent 2's wage does not depend on his own message. Agent 2 is paid sufficiently (the``efficiency wage'') if the project succeeds to make it worth his while to work. This mechanism has a non-cooperative equilibrium where agent 2 always announces agent 1's effort level truthfully and both agents work, but it is vulnerable to collusion among the agents. We study whether delegationÂ decentralization, where agents' pay is based on output but not oǹ`m essages,'' is optimal if agents can collude. We allow agents to sign side contracts, but we impose the limited liability constraint on transfers among the agents: when an agent has no money, he cannot transfer money to the other agent. Thus, the limited liability implies a form of non-transferable utility among the agents. The agents can write binding side contracts on variables that are observable to them (cf. Tirole [21] ). We assume for most of the paper that agent 1's effort, all messages, and all wages are observable to the agents. However, the agents cannot contract on agent 2's effort level, as it is unobservable to agent 1. This together with limited liability restricts the agents' ability to side contract. Agent 2 may only be able to make a side payment to agent 1 after the project has been successful so that agent 2 has received a high wage. However, anticipating this side payment in the success state, agent 2 may have an insufficient incentive to work hard (i.e., his income in the success state is below his efficiency wage). Since the transfer cannot be made independent of the outcome of the project, it may be impossible for agent 2 to transfer surplus to agent 1 without violating his own moral hazard constraint. Collusion then does not necessarily lead to the maximization of the sum of the agents' utilities: the Coase theorem does not hold with limited liability among the agents. By altering the distribution of wages among the agents while keeping the total wage payments fixed, the principal affects the set of feasible side contracts for the agents. Therefore, the distribution of wages among the agents is an important control variable for the principal.
We find that decentralization is optimal. In many cases, the optimal contract can be implemented by a linear organization as follows. The principal hires a single agent, the General Contractor, who is responsible for both design and construction of the project, and who is paid a sum of money when the project is successfully completed. The General Contractor is responsible for contracting with, and paying, the other agent. In the building profession this is called the designÂbuild process, and either the builder or the architect may be the General Contractor. For example, Kenneth Parry Associates, an architecture firm, was the general contractor in the construction of a duplex. Design Concepts, a construction management firm, was responsible for an elderly housing project. 2 In other cases, the optimal organization is triangular, and the principal pays both agents and lets them side contract with each other. This method of organizing construction is also used in the building trade.
If agent 1 (the architect) is the General Contractor, he must pay agent 2 (the builder) an efficiency wage to get him to work, because he cannot monitor the builder's effort. On the other hand, if the builder is the General Contractor, he can monitor and pay the architect according to the quality of the blueprint. This suggests that the builder should be the General Contractor so that his superior information about the architect's effort can be used to provide good incentives for the architect. In fact, making the builder the General Contractor is the (uniquely) best way to delegate under some parameter values, and in particular if the architect's effort is relatively cheap to induce for the builder. But notice that the principal will not pay the builder the full amount of what a successful project is worth to her: if she did, she would make no profit. Thus, the builder does not internalize the full value of the project and is tempted to save money by not paying the architect to work hard. This is a bigger problem the more costly is the architect's effort, and the less important it is for the success of the project. For in this case, to give the builder an incentive to sign a contract with the architect which induces the latter to work hard, the principal must promise the builder a very substantial part of the profit of the project. Then it may not be optimal to make the builder the General Contractor.
The architect should be the General Contractor if his own effort is rather costly to induce compared to the builder's effort, and his effort and the builder's effort are complements in the production function. In this case, the most important problem for the principal is to make sure the architect works. However, this problem is mitigated if the architect is the General Contractor, because working hard is then a way for him to transfer rent from the builder to himself. By producing a very good blueprint which makes the builder very efficient, the architect relaxes the builder's moral hazard constraint and reduces the builder's efficiency wage. The optimal contract in this case has the property that the sum of the agents' payoffs would be maximized if the architect shirked, but the architect works hard anyway to gain a more favorable distribution of the surplus. Thus, by delegating to the right agent, the principal makes sure both agents work even if this does not maximize the agents' joint surplus.
In the main part of the paper, we model centralization as a message game in the traditional mechanism design sense. Messages and wages are publicly observable, which makes collusion on messages easy and message games correspondingly ineffective. We show that such message games cannot improve on the optimal decentralized contract. However, as Maskin and Tirole [12] have argued, any mechanism which is compatible with the assumptions made in the models should not be ruled out a priori. In that spirit, in Section 6 we expand the class of message games to include games where messages and wages need not be publicly observable. In order to support collusion, the agents must use side payments (``bribes'') that are conditional on the outcome of the game. Now let the principal pay secret randomized wages, and let the wage be zero with some probability. This makes it difficult for an agent to credibly promise to pay a bribe, for ex post he can pretend he never received his wage and therefore he cannot pay. In this case collusion is difficult, and we show that such message games (centralization) can do better than decentralization. But a court might find it difficult to enforce randomized wages, so this mechanism may actually not be feasible. An alternative way to eliminate collusion is to keep messages secret. If it cannot be verified whether or not an agent``snitched,'' collusion is again made difficult. However, secret messages do not work if the principal is also a player who can collude, for then he will always convince the agent to send the message which minimizes the wages paid to the other agent. Therefore, the optimality of delegation is robust to the consideration of this more general class of mechanisms if we take the principal's commitment problem and incentives to collude into account. The literature on multi-agent incentive schemes shows that a nonindividualistic situation with monitoring and collusion can be strictly better for the principal than a purely individualistic scheme (Itoh [7] , Holmstro m and Milgrom [6] , Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo [11] , Ramakrishnan and Thakor [19] , Tirole [21] ). While it is true also in our model that a purely individualistic scheme (with neither monitoring nor side contracting) would not be optimal, our focus is different: we consider the optimal distribution of wages and predict how the principal should delegate. In addition, this literature in general does not allow centralized schemes with monitoring and message games. An exception is Itoh [7] , who shows that when there is transferable utility and the agents know the entire effort profile, the principal gains no advantage from a message game: agents anyway always contract on the messages and effort levels that maximize the sum of expected utilities (the Coase theorem holds). This argument is not valid in our model, since utility is not transferable due to limited liability. The idea that collusion can destroy the usefulness of message games is also explored by Baliga [2] .
A different strand of the literature looks at the impact of collusion in a principal supervisor agent setting (Tirole [20] and [21] ). This literature takes the structure of the hierarchy as given and analyzes how the optimal incentive scheme is modified by the possibility of side contracting. Recent literature compares decentralized and centralized incentive schemes without collusion in adverse selection models (Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein [14] and [15] , Mookherjee and Reichelstein [17] and [18] , and McAfee and McMillan [13] ). These authors have obtained conditions under which decentralization can replicate the second-best centralized contract (without collusion). 3 In our model there is also a condition (Case A) which implies that decentralization can mimic the second-best contract (without collusion). When this condition is not satisfied, decentralization cannot achieve what centralization (message games) could achieve in the absence of collusion, but it does as well as centralization if centralized schemes are subject to collusion.
Finally, two recent papers look at the advantages of decentralized versus centralized contracts in the presence of collusion. Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo [10] study the negative effects of different coalitional structures, including those where the principal colludes with one of the agents, in a model of moral hazard. Laffont and Martimort [8] look at an adverse selection model where agents know only their own cost of production and collude under asymmetric information. They show that if in any centralized scheme the principal is restricted to``anonymous'' contracts, delegation performs strictly better than centralization. 4 The focus of our paper is somewhat different; in particular, we study how the principal should delegate.
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2. THE MODEL Two agents work in sequence. Agent 1, who is in charge of design or research and development, delivers a blueprint to agent 2, who does the actual production. (Other interpretations are possible, such as that of a production-line where agents work sequentially.) The effort put in by agent i, e i , is either zero or one, and the cost of one unit of effort is c i . Let e=(e 1 , e 2 ). When agent 1 delivers the blueprint to agent 2, agent 2 learns agent 1's effort e 1 by inspecting the blueprint. The blueprint is of low quality if agent 1 shirked (e 1 =0) but of high quality if agent 1 worked hard (e 1 =1). Since the principal does not observe e 1 , agent 2 is better informed than the principal. Neither agent 1 nor the principal can observe e 2 .
After the agents have worked (or shirked), the project is revealed to be either a success or failure. This outcome is public information. The probability of a success is p e 1 e 2 , if agent i 's effort is e i # [0, 1]. We assume 0< p 00 < p 11 <1 and p 00 < p e 1 e 2 < p 11 when e 1 {e 2 .
Both the agents and the principal know the parameters (c 1 , c 2 , p 00 , p 01 , p 10 , p 11 ), so there is no adverse selection.
The wage cannot directly depend on effort, as it is not observed by the principal. However, it can depend on the outcome of the project and on messages sent by the agents in some game designed by the principal. If agent i consumes w i units of money, and his effort level is e i , then his payoff is w i &e i c i . Agents have zero wealth. All wages must be nonnegative due to the limited liability of the agents. Each agent must be offered an expected payoff of at least zero in order to participate.
We assume the principal wants both agents to work hard, e=(1, 1), as the project is sufficiently valuable to her. The issue is at what cost this full effort profile can be achieved. If the effort of both agents were observable to the principal, the``first best'' contract would require both agents to work and would pay agent i the wage c i . The cost to the principal would be c 1 +c 2 . However, agent 2's effort is unobservable to everybody except himself. Therefore, for agent 2 to work, a moral hazard constraint must be satisfied. The``second-best'' contract pays agent 1 the expected wage c 1 and satisfies agent 2's moral hazard constraint at the lowest possible cost. Let w 2 be the wage for agent 2 if the outcome is a success (it is clearly optimal to pay zero when the project fails). The moral hazard constraint for agent 2 is p 11 w 2 &c 2 p 10 w 2 . The expected cost to the principal from the second best contract is therefore
The extra cost to the principal, c 2 p 10 Â( p 11 & p 10 ), is a rent earned by agent 2.
If the agents cannot collude, full effort can be implemented at the second best cost by asking agent 2 to report agent 1's effort. If the project is unsuccessful, both agents get zero. If it is successful, agent 2 gets w 2 = c 2 Â( p 11 & p 10 ), and 1 gets w 1 =c 1 Âp 11 if 2 has announced that 1's effort was high, otherwise agent 1 gets zero. This mechanism has an equilibrium where agent 2 truthfully reports agent 1's effort level, and both agents work hard. (There may exist other equilibria: unlike Ma [9] , we will not require unique implementation.) Moreover, it is clearly necessary to include a message game in order to implement full effort at the second best cost, as without messages a moral hazard constraint would have to hold also for agent 1, implying a rent for agent 1. But the message game is vulnerable to collusion. If agent 1 shirks, he is willing to pay a bribe to 2 in order for him not to``snitch.'' Since agent 2's wage does not depend on his message, he is willing to accept the bribe.
We end this section by comparing our model to two alternative models. The first is a situation where the agents work in complete isolation and neither agent can monitor the other's effort level. In that case, a moral hazard constraint must be satisfied also for agent 1, and the principal could not implement full effort at a cost lower than
This is greater than (1) and indeed greater than the cost the principal can achieve in our model under the assumption that agent 2 can monitor agent 1 and the agents can collude. Thus, as in Itoh [7] , a nonindividualistic context with monitoring and collusion is better for the principal than a purely individualistic scheme without monitoring. See also Holmstro m and Milgrom [6] , Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo [11] and Ramakrishnan and Thakor [19] .
The second alternative model would maintain the assumption that agent 2 can monitor and side-contract with agent 1, but would drop the assumption of limited liability. Then the principal can implement full effort at``first best'' cost c 1 +c 2 by``selling the firm'' to agent 2, who in effect becomes the new principal who can monitor and side-contract with agent 1. This solves the moral hazard problem completely. Formally, consider the following contract. Let F be the value to the principal of a failed project, and let F+2 be the value of a success. Our assumption that the principal wants both agents to work hard at the first best implies
Pay agent 2 the amount w Before playing the game, i.e., before time zero, the agents can sign a side contract which is assumed to be enforceable. 6 If some agent refuses to sign a side contract, we suppose they proceed to play a subgame perfect equilibrium of 1 (M, w). A side contract c=(e 1 , m, t) specifies: (i) agent 1's effort level e 1 , (ii) the list m of all messages to be sent to the principal, and (iii) a pair of transfers t=(t s , t f ), where t s (t f ) is the sum of money to be paid from agent 1 to agent 2 if the project is a success (failure). The side contract cannot specify agent 2's unobservable effort level as such a contract would not be enforceable.
To be feasible, the side transfers must satisfy
If a side contract c is signed, 1 (M, w) is replaced by the following game: at stages 0 2, each agent must behave as specified by c (this simplification is justified by the assumption that violating c is prohibitively costly). At stage 3, agent 2 decides to work or shirk. At stage 4 wages and transfers (as specified by c) are paid. If the side contract specifies e 1 # [0, 1] and messages m, then player 2 will work iff the increase in his expected wages cover the cost of his effort, i.e., iff
We refer to (5) as agent 2's moral hazard constraint. If equality holds in (5) then agent 2 is indifferent between working or shirking. In this case we assume that he works. Thus from now on, E 1 (M, w) is the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs where ties are broken in favor of working.
Consider a feasible side contract c=(e 1 , m, t). Since it specifies all actions except e 2 , and e 2 =1 iff (5) holds, each player i can compute his expected payoff ? i (c) from signing this contract c. Then c is an equilibrium side contract for (M, w) iff it satisfies: (E1) For each i, there is
There is no other feasible side contract c$ satisfying ? 1 (c$)>? 1 (c) and ? 2 (c$)>? 2 (c). Thus, each player i should be better off by signing the contract c than by refusing to sign and instead playing some subgame perfect equilibrium which results in payoffs x i , and there is no other feasible side contract c$ that could be signed which strongly Pareto dominates c. 8 (Our results would also hold for weak Pareto domination.)
A feasible side contract c=(e 1 , m, t) implements full effort at the cost C iff e 1 =1, (5) holds, and
It could happen that a subgame perfect equilibrium of 1 (M, w) is not Pareto dominated by any feasible side contract, so the agents have no (strict) incentive to collude. But even in this case, the agents can just as well sign the side contract that tells them to play according to this subgame perfect equilibrium. This will be an equilibrium side contract, since E1 is trivially satisfied and E2 holds by assumption. So without loss of generality, assume that a side contract is always signed before stage zero. A mechanism (M, w) implements full effort at the cost C, if there exists some equilibrium side contract c for (M, w) which implements full effort at the cost C.
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If there are many side contracts that satisfy E1 and E2 then the Pareto frontier for the agents is non-trivial, and we assume the agents will choose that side contract which maximizes the principal's payoff. In order to implement full effort uniquely, some sort of message game would be needed to reduce the Pareto frontier to one point. An example is provided by thè`o ption mechanism'' in the appendix. However, we shall not require unique implementation in this paper.
NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we state necessary conditions for implementation by any mechanism, including message games.
DECENTRALIZATION AND COLLUSION
Proposition 1. Full effort cannot be implemented by any mechanism at a cost lower than
Proof. Since agent 1 must be compensated for his effort and player 2's moral hazard constraint requires that he gets at least c 2 Â( p 11 & p 10 ) if the project is a success, the proposition follows. K Suppose full effort is implemented, and let w i denote the wage agent i receives in equilibrium when the project is successful. There is no reason to pay anything in case of failure (see the appendix). By Proposition 1, the expected wage payments p 11 (w 1 +w 2 ) must exceed (6), i.e.,
Since the agents can collude, there are some additional considerations. Although there is limited liability, it turns out to be useful to look at the sum of the payoffs of the agents. If full effort is implemented, then this sum is p 11 (w 1 +w 2 )&c 1 &c 2 in equilibrium. If both agents shirk, without changing their messages, the sum of their payoffs would be p 00 (w 1 +w 2 ). Thus, the sum is greater when both work than when both shirk if and only if
Our next result shows that this``team moral hazard constraint'' must be satisfied in equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Full effort cannot be implemented by any mechanism at a cost lower than
Proof. In the appendix.
If agent 2 works but agent 1 shirks, the sum of their payoffs would be p 01 (w 1 +w 2 )&c 2 . The sum is greater when both work than when only agent 2 works if and only if
However, (9) may be violated by the optimal contract. Why would agent 1 work if it does not maximize the total surplus for the agents, and the agents can collude? Even though the total surplus is increased when agent 1 shirks (while agent 2 works), a greater share of the surplus may have to be given to agent 2 to induce him to work with a low quality blueprint. This means a smaller share for agent 1, which can make him worse off. Agent 1 may be able to reduce the rent agent 2 must be given (to satisfy his moral hazard constraint) by working hard himself. If agent 1 works hard, then agent 2 needs an``efficiency wage'' equal to c 2 Â( p 11
then agent 2's rent is reduced if agent 1 works hard and produces a good blueprint. In this case, the fact that agent 1's effort relaxes agent 2's moral hazard constraint can make agent 1 work hard even though it reduces the total surplus (i.e., even if (9) is violated). The necessary condition for implementation (Proposition 3) turns out to be that the total surplus when both work hard must be greater than the total surplus when agent 1 shirks minus the amount of rent that agent 1 can transfer to himself by working hard. This condition is
where the expression is square brackets is the reduction in agent 2's rent if agent 1 works hard.
Proposition 3. Suppose (10) holds. Then, full effort cannot be implemented by any mechanism at a cost lower than
Notice that (11) is equivalent to p 11 (w 1 +w 2 ) being greater than the expression in Eq. (12) . The previous discussion showed that the positive expression in square brackets in (12) is the reduction in agent 2's rent which can be achieved if agent 1 works hard and produces a good
In the next section, we show how this can be achieved by making agent 1 a General Contractor.
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The remaining possibility is that (10) is violated. Then it is cheaper to motivate agent 2 to work when agent 1 shirks. In this case, if (9) is violated then there is not only more surplus to share if agent 1 shirks but this also reduces the rent agent 2 needs to work. Then agent 1 would certainly shirk, so full effort would not be implemented. Therefore, if (10) is violated then (9) must be satisfied. This is the content of Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Suppose (10) does not hold. Then full effort cannot be implemented by any mechanism at a cost lower than
SIMPLE CONTRACTS
In Section 4, we found lower bounds for the cost of implementing full effort, using any mechanism (including message games). Only one of the lower bounds derived in Propositions 1 4 will actually be binding: which one depends on the parameters. (The binding constraint is of course the one with the highest cost). We will consider the different cases separately, and we show that in each case, there is a simple contract without messages which implements full effort at a cost equal to the greatest of the lower bounds. Thus, such simple contracts are always optimal.
By definition, a mechanism is a simple contract if the principal pays agent i a wage w i if the project is successful, pays nothing if the project fails, and there are no messages: M
The simple contract is then defined by the success wages (w 1 , w 2 ). The extensive form game induced by the simple contract will be denoted 1 (w 1 , w 2 ) (or just 1 if there is no chance of confusion). Due to our tie-breaking rule, E 1 is in fact a singleton. A side contract c specifies 1's effort level e 1 and a transfer t to be paid from 1 to 2 if the project is a success, but there are no messages, so we write c=(e 1 , t).
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Since agent 2 can observe the effort of agent 1, one might expect that the optimal simple contract involves delegating the task of monitoring and paying agent 1 to agent 2. We will show that this intuition holds if the right hand side of (7) is greater than the right hand side of (8) and (9), but not necessarily otherwise.
Case A
This is the case
We know that full effort cannot be implemented by any mechanism at a cost lower than (6). We will show that if (14) holds then this lower bound can be attained by a simple contract. Thus, such contracts are optimal. Moreover, the unique way to implement full effort at this cost using a simple contract is to set w 2 =c 2 Â( p 11 & p 10 )+c 1 Âp 11 and w 1 =0. That is, agent 1 should not be paid anything by the principal. Agent 2 should be a General Contractor who receives the whole wage packet from the principal in case of success, and who side contracts with agent 1 to get a good blue print. It is necessary that w 1 =0 (i.e., agent 2 must be a General Contractor).
In the optimal simple contract for Case A, the sum of the agents payoffs is maximized when both work. It is an equilibrium side contract for the agents to agree that agent 1 should work, and agent 2 pays c 1 Âp 11 to agent 1 if the project is a success. This contract leaves agent 1 with a zero surplus, and agent 2 keeps enough money in the good state to precisely satisfy the moral hazard constraint. If the principal were to promise a positive wage to agent 1, agent 1 would never agree to a side contract which gives him zero surplus. So w 1 =0 is necessary.
Case A occurs when p 11 & p 10 is small. Then, when agent 1 has worked hard, the``blueprint'' is so good that agent 2's effort does not increase the probability of success by much. In this case, the production department's moral hazard constraint is difficult to satisfy. If the research department were given part of the money (w 1 >0), it would not transfer any of it to the production department; it prefers to have the production department shirk as success is likely anyway and getting the production department to work is so costly. So the principal must pay enough so that the sum of expected payoffs is maximized when both agents work, give the wage packet to the production department, and let it monitor and pay the research department according to the quality of the blueprint. The production department earns a rent as its effort is unobservable. Holmstro m and Milgrom [6] , Itoh [7] and Ramakrishnan and Thakor [19] also suggest that delegation to the agent with superior information (agent 2) is optimal. However, in our model there are other cases too.
Case B
Like in case A, the sum of the agents' payoffs is maximized when both work, and if agent 2 is the General Contractor then he will sign a contract with agent 1 that makes both agents work. Thus, delegating to agent 2 is optimal (w 1 =0). However, in contrast to Case A, the most difficult constraint is the``team moral hazard constraint'' (8) , and the main concern is for w 1 +w 2 to be sufficiently large that it pays for both agents to work rather than shirk. It is therefore possible to set w 1 >0, as long as agent 2 keeps enough of the surplus that he is willing to work. If agent 2 gets an insufficient share of the surplus, he would need a transfer from agent 1 in order to work. Since agent 1 cannot observe agent 2's effort, the transfer has to be big enough to satisfy agent 2's moral hazard constraint. But this gives agent 2 a rent, and agent 1 might then prefer to have agent 2 shirk rather than transferring this rent. Thus, although w 1 =0 is not the only possibility, w 1 cannot be too big.
We know from Section 4 that full effort cannot be implemented by any mechanism at a cost lower than
Full effort can be implemented at this cost by making agent 2 the General Contractor.
Proposition 6. Suppose (15) holds. Full effort can be implemented by a simple contract at the cost
It is possible (but not necessary) to set w 1 =0 (i.e., agent 2 can be a General Contractor).
Case C
This is the remaining case, where
Agent 1's effort costs him c 1 , and increases the probability of success by p 11 & p 01 (assuming 2 works). When (16) holds, it is relatively costly for agent 1 to improve the probability of success, and hence it is tempting for the agents to allow 1 to shirk.
Suppose (10) holds, as in Proposition 3. When (16) and (10) hold, it turns out to be optimal for the principal to pay wages in such a way that (9) is violated, and the sum of the agents' expected payoffs when both work is smaller than the sum of the expected payoffs when agent 1 shirks and agent 2 works.
11 That is,
Just as explained in Section 4, for this configuration of parameters the principal can exploit the fact that agent 1 is willing to work hard to transfer rent from agent 2 to himself. Suppose agent 1 is the General Contractor who is given all of the wages in case of success, i.e., w 2 =0. For agent 2 to work, he must receive a transfer from agent 1 if the project is successful. Now, (10) implies that the expected transfer that must be given to agent 2 to make him work is greater when agent 1 has shirked than when agent 1 has worked hard: agent 2's marginal productivity is reduced by working with a low quality blueprint. Consider the following two side contracts. Under contract : both agents work, and agent 1 transfers t : =c 2 Â( p 11 & p 10 ) to agent 2 if the project succeeds. This is the smallest transfer that will make agent 2 work (his efficiency wage), and it will give him a rent equal to p 10 c 2 Â( p 11 & p 10 ). Under contract ; agent 1 shirks, and pays agent 2 transfer t ; =c 2 Â( p 01 & p 00 ) if the project succeeds. This is the smallest transfer that will make agent 2 work given that 1 has shirked, and it will give agent 2 a rent equal to p 00 c 2 Â( p 01 & p 00 ). Since (10) holds, agent 2 prefers 211 DECENTRALIZATION AND COLLUSION 11 Notice that if the right hand side of (9) is smaller than the right hand side expressions of (7) and (8), then (9) must in fact hold because we have shown that (7) and (8) 
Moreover, if (18) holds there is no way of making contract ; more attractive for agent 1, as any reduction in t ; will cause agent 2 to shirk. Since contract ; is joint surplus maximizing, agent 2 would like to make an ex ante lump sum transfer to agent 1 in exchange for incentive contract ;, but lump sum transfers are ruled out by the limited liability (agent 2 cannot pay in the failure state). If agent 1 is a General Contractor, he will prefer contract :.
The crucial issue is the degree of complementarity between the two agents' inputs. If (10) holds then agent 1's effort makes agent 2 more productive. If agent 1 is the General Contractor then he works hard to relax agent 2's moral hazard constraint (even if it reduces total surplus). Thus, while in case A, the principal should not pay agent 1 to assure implementation of an effort profile (1, 1) that maximizes the sum of the agents' expected payoffs, now she must pay agent 1 to prevent implementation of an effort profile (0, 1) that maximizes the sum of expected payoffs. If agent 2 receives a large share of the wage packet and e=(0, 1) maximizes the sum of the payoffs, then the outcome will be e=(0, 1) because agent 2 will never pay agent 1 to work in this case. So it is not optimal to make agent 2 a General Contractor.
Define
If (10) and (16) hold then
It follows from Propositions 1, 2, and 3 that full effort cannot be implemented by any mechanism at a cost below p 11 w*. 
<w* (i.e., agent 2 cannot be a General Contractor).
The final case is when (16) holds but (10) does not hold. Proposition 4 shows that no contract can have a cost lower than p 11 c 1 Â( p 11 & p 01 ). Again, this lower bound can be achieved by a simple contract. Since (10) does not hold, w 1 =0 is again optimal.
Proposition 8. Suppose (16) holds but (10) does not hold. Then full effort can be implemented by a simple contract at the cost
To summarize the discussion of cases A, B, and C, it is optimal (within the class of all mechanisms) to make agent 2 the General Contractor, except when (10) and (16) hold. The only remaining issue is, if (10) and (16) hold, is it optimal to make agent 1 the General Contractor, or must the principal pay both agents? Suppose we set w 1 =w* and w 2 =0. Then as shown in the proof of Proposition 7, if agent 1 wants agent 2 to work, he prefers to also work himself to minimize agent 2's rent. Does agent 1 want to induce agent 2 to work? By working and paying agent 2 his efficiency wage c 2 Â( p 11 & p 10 ), agent 1's payoff is
By working alone and paying nothing to agent 2, agent 1 gets p 10 w*&c 1 , and if both agents shirk, agent 1 gets p 00 w*. This implies that agent 1 is willing to pay agent 2 to work if and only if
Thus, if (10) and (16) and w 2 >0) , that is, a``triangular'' organization is optimal for the principal. Notice that (21) holds if and only if p 10 w*&c 1 and p 00 w* are both low, which happens if p 10 and p 00 are both low, i.e., if agent 2 is vital for the success of the project. Then if agent 1 is a General Contractor he will have the incentive to pay agent 2 an efficiency wage to work, and he will work hard himself to reduce the efficiency wage.
ELIMINATING COLLUSION BY LIMITING PUBLIC INFORMATION
In this section we consider two ways of eliminating collusion: secret (randomized) wages and secret messages. Once collusion is made impossible, message games can be used to implement full effort at the second best cost.
First, suppose the principal can design a message game where at stage 4 each agent can observe his own wage but not the other agent's wage. Section 4 established the minimum cost of getting full effort for different parameters with public wage payments, and this cost was, in general, strictly higher than the second best cost. We now show how secret randomized wages reduce this cost.
We need to be specific about how side contracts are enforced. We suppose the agents have access to a third party, called a``union,'' which punishes deviations from a side contract. The union can inspect a collusive agreement, it observes side-payments, messages, and agent 1's effort, and will punish an agent who cheats. But by assumption, it cannot monitor secret wage payments (or agent 2's effort). Let the cost of being punished by the union be h>0, where possibly h=+ . Suppose that the principal pays randomized secret wages. Neither the agents nor the union can observe the randomizations. To make sure that the principal uses the right probabilities and does not cheat, we can suppose the principal keeps a record of wage payments and randomizations. These are not made available to the agents or to the union. However, an impartial``judge'' can inspect the documents and make sure that the principal does not cheat.
If the principal actually pays zero with some probability, the agents cannot make credible promises of monetary transfers. An agent can always claim to have received a zero wage and refuse to pay, and it will be impossible for the union to know if he is lying. If the union only punishes an agent who it knows has surely broken a side contract, this clearly renders side payments (and hence collusion) impossible. In fact, even if the union would be willing to punish an agent on the mere suspicion that he may have been cheating his co-worker, collusion can still be ruled out. This is shown formally in Appendix 2. Without collusion, message games are valuable and full effort can be obtained the second best cost c 1 + p 11 c 2 Â ( p 11 & p 10 ). We conclude that the combination of public messages and secret random wages leads to an improvement compared to the results derived in Section 4.
Secret wages are common in the real world, but a judge might find enforcing a randomized scheme problematic. Suppose the principal can only pay secret non-randomized wages, but also messages sent by the agents to the principal can be kept secret. For example, academic tenure decisions may involve senior faculty members sending secret messages to the dean. The dean will never reveal the content of messages to a junior professor. In the case of a law suit involving a tenure decision, a judge can decide the case after inspecting the relevant documents, which are kept on file by the dean, but the judge will never tell a junior professor the precise content of the secret messages.
Secret messages destroy collusion opportunities among the agents, for the union will not be able to verify if agent 2 has sent the``right'' message to the principal about agent 1's effort. However, secret messages open the possibility for the principal to collude with agent 2. Suppose the principal and agent 2 have access to a third party which will enforce collusion, similar to the previously described``union.'' Even if messages are secret, collusion between the principal and agent 2 cannot be ruled out. First, the principal has no budget restriction, so he cannot (as agent 1 above) refuse to pay a side payment for lack of money. Second, the principal can always store the secret messages and, if necessary, show them to the third party. Therefore, it will be possible for a third party to enforce collusion between the principal and agent 2.
14 We now show how this can make secret messages useless.
Consider a mechanism where at stage 2 agent 2 reports agent 1's effort: 14 Agent 2 sees e 1 and the principal does not, so collusion between agent 2 and the principal could potentially involve asymmetric information as in Laffont and Martimort [8] . However, in an equilibrium which implements full effort, the principal knows that e 1 =1 with probability one so along the equilibrium path there is no asymmetric information. Thus, if agent 1's wages are not minimized along the equilibrium path, there will be a collusive contract which the principal can propose to agent 2, and which agent 2 will accept, involving changing the messages so that agent 1's wages are minimized. Such a proposal has no``signalling'' effects because the principal has no private information.
Substituting (26) in (23) yields in this case collusion on the part of the principal can be ruled out). If secret randomizations are impossible to enforce for a third party, then the contracts analyzed in the main part of this paper are the best available to the principal.
7. APPENDIX 1: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 2
Since the Coase theorem does not hold, a crucial decision variable for the principal is the distribution of surplus among the agents. By giving each agent the``option'' to receive a certain guaranteed payoff, the principal makes sure that the distribution of surplus is the right one. In fact, it is quite straightforward to show that a message game called an option mechanism, where each agent says``stay'' or``leave,'' will always be optimal. We will prove this as a preliminary result in Lemma 9. In fact, as long as the agents can collude on messages, this result seems to be more general than our particular model. The next step, to show that no message at all is necessary is more difficult, and this result may be sensitive to the precise assumptions we made in the paper.
A mechanism is an option mechanism if and only if M The option mechanism is not collusion-proof: in equilibrium, agents may sign a side contract. However, agent i will never accept a payoff less than ? i , which he can guarantee himself by saying leave and refusing to work. Thus, by choosing the numbers (? 1 , ? 2 ) the principal influences the collusive contracts the agents may sign.
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Lemma 9. Suppose a mechanism (M, w) has a side contract c^which implements full effort. Then, the option mechanism where wages are given by (27), with ? i =? i (c^), has an equilibrium side contract cÄ which implements full effort. In the equilibrium side contract cÄ of the option mechanism, both agents work hard, announce stay, there are no side payments and the expected wage payments are the same as in the equilibrium side contract c^of the mechanism (M, w).
Proof. Suppose c^=(e^1 , m , t^) is an equilibrium side contract of a mechanism (M, w) which implements full effort. By definition, the equilibrium payoffs are
Consider a mechanism (M , w Ä ) such that: M 
Notice that expected wage payments in the new mechanism if both agents announce stay are the same as in the equilibrium side contract c^of (M, w). We claim that cÄ =(eÄ 1 , m Ä , tÃ ), where eÄ 1 =1, m Ä 1 =m Ä 2 =stay and tÃ =(0, 0), is an equilibrium side contract of (M , w Ä ) which implements full effort. To check this, first notice that signing cÄ in (M , w Ä ) gives agent 2 an incentive to work, and results in payoffs ? i (cÄ )=? i (c^) where the ? i (c^) are given by (28) and (29). Agent 1, of course, must work once he signs cÄ , since side contracts are binding. We only need to verify the conditions E1 and E2 of the definition of equilibrium side contract. Now, E1 holds for the contract cÄ because if some agent refuses to accept cÄ , it is a subgame perfect equilibrium for both to announce leave which gives agent i the wage ? i (c^) for sure, which is no improvement. Condition E2 holds because if there exists a feasible side contract c$=(e$ 1 , m$, t$) for (M , w Ä ) which satisfies ? 1 (c$)>? 1 (cÄ ) and ? 2 (c$)>? 2 (cÄ ), then it must be that m$=(stay, stay). But then the agents would be able to improve on c^in the original mechanism (M, w) too, via the following feasible side contract: agent 1 agrees to e$ 1 , the agents send the original messages m (which gives the same wages as m$=(stay, stay) in (M , w Ä )), and the transfers are t^+t$. This precisely duplicates the side contract c$. However, such an improvement contradicts c^being an equilibrium side contract (i.e., it contradicts condition E2). Therefore, (M , w Ä ) implements full effort.
Finally, given that (M , w Ä ) implements full effort, consider the option mechanism with (w
Comparing (30) (31) and (32), and using (28) and (29), we find that the option mechanism is identical to (M , w Ä ) if in the original mechanism (M, w) it is true that w f 1 (m )=w f 2 (m )=0. Otherwise, the option mechanism differs by shifting all the wage payments to the success state, but the expected wages conditional on both working and announcing stay is the same as in (M , w Ä ) (which in turn is the same as in (M, w) ). Clearly the option mechanism makes shirking less desirable for each individual agent. Since it reduces the sum of expected wage payments for all effort profiles where at least one agent shirks, it makes collusion to shirk less desirable too. So, if the agents agree to work in (M , w Ä ) (as we assume) then they should certainly agree to work in the option mechanism. Indeed, consider the side contract for the option mechanism: cÄ =(eÄ 1 =1, m Ä =(stay, stay), tÃ =(0, 0)). Then this side contract is feasible and implements full effort. Therefore, the option mechanism implements full effort. K Proof of Proposition 2. We claim effort cannot be implemented by any mechanism at a cost lower than p 11 c 1 +c 2 p 11 & p 00 .
By Lemma 9 we can without loss of generality consider an option mechanism which implements full effort without side payments. Let w i #w s i (stay, stay).
By the Lemma, we can focus on an equilibrium side contract of the form cÄ =(eÄ 1 , m Ä , tÃ ) with eÄ 1 =1, m Ä =(stay, stay) and tÃ =(0, 0). The payoffs for the agents are (? 1 , ? 2 ) where ? i = p 11 w i &c i 0.
The contract cÄ must satisfy the conditions E1 and E2 of the definition of equilibrium side contract.
Suppose, in order to derive a contradiction, that the cost to the principal is p 11 (w 1 +w 2 )< p 11 c 1 +c 2 p 11 & p 00 .
We shall construct a new side contract c~which both agents strictly prefer to cÄ . To this end, define c~= (e~1 , m , t~) where e~1=0, m =(stay, stay) 
We claim full effort cannot be implemented by any mechanism at a cost lower than (20) implies that agent 1's contribution ( p 11 & p 01 ) w* is smaller than his cost of effort c 1 , so agent 2 will never work and pay agent 1 to work. K to this contract, i.e., if agent 1 does not work or if agent 2 does not announce work even though agent 1 worked, the union punishes the cheating agent at a cost of h c 1 (it is possible because the union can observe agent 1's effort level and public messages by assumption). This contract is an equilibrium side-contract as it certainly satisfies E1 and also satisfies E2 as by the above argument other collusive contracts cannot be enforced. If the principal is to collude successfully with agent 2 and give him the incentive to announce shirk after agent 1 has in fact worked, she must pay 2 at least c 1 to counterbalance the punishment the workers' union will impose on agent 2. But then there is no incentive for the principal to collude with agent 2 as her total payments do not go down.
